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Partisanship by Invitation: Immigrants Respond
to Political Campaigns
James A. McCann, Purdue University
Katsuo A. Nishikawa Chávez, Trinity University
As the size of the foreign-born population in the United States has climbed, political scientists have focused increasing
attention on immigrant incorporation into American politics. Much previous work emphasizes the impediments to
partisan incorporation for the foreign-born. Drawing from two-wave panel surveys of Mexican immigrants administered during the national elections of 2006 and 2008, we show that levels of partisanship for this population rise
markedly in campaign environments. These shifts are largely in a Democratic direction. An experiment embedded in
the 2008 survey demonstrates that immigrants are highly sensitive to political appeals extended by the Democratic side
and modest amounts of exposure to political advertisements can have sizable long-term effects on party identiﬁcation.
These ﬁndings suggest that while the foreign-born may never possess the kinds of stable partisan orientations that are
characteristic of native-born Americans, they are no strangers to party politics.

O

ne of the most striking features of life in the United
States in the twenty-ﬁrst century is the growing ethnic diversity in all parts of the country, a phenomenon that is due in large part to a rapid rise in migrant settlement from abroad. At present, some 42 million people in the
United States are foreign-born, or approximately one-eighth
of the total population. The vast majority of immigrants are
of Latin American or Asian origin. By contrast, in the early
1970s, only about 1 in 20 residents was an immigrant. This
substantial growth in the foreign-born population has sparked
much interest among political scientists in the social, economic, motivational, administrative, and political factors that
encourage or impede immigrant incorporation into American democracy. Much of this work examines formal indicators of democratic expression and inclusion, such as acquiring citizenship rights through naturalization, participating in
elections, involvement in community groups, signing petitions, or making donations to political causes (e.g., Barreto

2005; Kam, Zechmeister, and Wilking 2008; Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Ramakrishnan 2005; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). In this article, we focus on an equally
important but informal marker of political incorporation,
self-described membership in a major party.
For generations, the Democratic and Republican parties
have served as the principal foundations of American political and civic life. The contours of partisan afﬁliations within
the mass public tell us much about the quality of democratic
representation in the United States—whose voices are expressed, how these voices are expressed, which campaigns for
ofﬁce are successful, and ultimately what issues make it to
a governing agenda. Unlike political parties in many other
well-established democracies, the Democrats and Republicans have no formal admission records. For this reason, it has
become standard practice when polling the electorate to inquire about partisan self-identiﬁcations. Indeed, no survey of
political attitudes would be complete without instrumenta-
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tion on partisanship, and the scholarly literature on party
identiﬁcation is perhaps the largest in the entire ﬁeld of public opinion research.
Much less is known about the partisan inclinations of
the foreign-born and how these attitudes compare to those
of native-born Americans. The general consensus among
scholars is that partisanship is relatively shallow within this
population (Abrajano 2010; Abrajano and Alvarez 2010;
Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Fraga et al. 2011; Hajnal
and Lee 2011; Jones-Correa 1998; Junn et al. 2011; Lien,
Conway, and Wong 2004; Nguyen and Garand 2009; Pantoja
2013; Schildkraut 2013; Wong 2006). As Schildkraut (2013,
29–30) writes, the incidence of party identiﬁcation among
immigrants today “is low, which is attributed to a variety of
factors, including the lack of information about American
partisan politics, the lack of outreach by parties, and that
issues of central concern to immigrants might not align with
the nation’s current left/right divide.”
Without denying the signiﬁcance of these impediments,
we offer a somewhat different perspective on partisan inclusion, one that situates party membership within the ebb
and ﬂow of electoral processes and uncovers a level of partisanship that had previously gone unnoticed. We focus in
particular on Mexicans in the United States. Nearly onethird of the contemporary foreign-born population emigrated
from Mexico, a percentage that far exceeds other nationality
groups. It is therefore ﬁtting when assessing trajectories of
immigrant incorporation into American party politics to pay
close attention to the Mexican community, though of course
this limits our ability to generalize across the entire foreignborn population. Given that Mexicans lag behind other immigrant groups with respect to naturalization rates, educational attainment, and other indicators of social, economic,
and civic integration, the Mexican-born could be considered
a “hard case” for political inclusion (Perlmann 2005).
These background circumstances notwithstanding, analyses of original panel surveys of Mexican immigrants conducted over two recent election cycles (2006 and 2008) reveal that a considerable amount of partisan bonding takes
place during major national campaigns. Election periods are
moments of intense political conﬂict when invitations to
“join the party” become ubiquitous (Brady, Johnston, and
Sides 2006). The ﬁndings presented below indicate that Mexicans in the United States respond to these signals. Exposure
to campaign invitations can have large and durable effects on
partisan membership, with the Democratic Party being the
main beneﬁciary. When gauging levels of partisan belonging
among the foreign-born, political calendars matter. We also
ﬁnd evidence, however, of reliable negative partisanship. The
Mexican immigrants in our study were reluctant to identify
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with the Republican Party even when exposed to political
advertising that dramatically boosted ratings of the Republican standard-bearer John McCain. This mixture of dynamic “positive” partisanship with respect to one major party
coupled with rather stable “negative” partisanship regarding the other stands in marked contrast to patterns of party
identiﬁcation that have long been recognized within the general American public.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
When asked whether they usually think of themselves as a
Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or something else,
approximately two out of three citizens in recent decades
have identiﬁed as partisans according to surveys conducted
by the American National Election Study. Two theoretical
conceptualizations have framed much of the research on
these attitudes. The ﬁrst, which dates to the seminal work of
Campbell et al. (1960), draws from reference and small
group theory: “The tie between individual and party is psychological—an extension of one’s ego to include feeling a
part of a group” (Miller and Shanks 1996, 120). Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) offer a social identity theory of
partisanship that builds on this premise. Recognizing that
the Democrats and Republicans comprise many diverse groups
that reﬂect the major divisions in society along ethnic, racial,
occupational, gender, generational, and other lines, Green et al.
posit that Americans implicitly ask themselves what groups
come to mind when thinking about the two parties and which
set of groups if any best describes them (2002, 8). Stereotypical
understandings of partisan blocs combine with self-appraisal
to foster identiﬁcation as a party member.
An alternative conceptualization of partisanship highlights
the instrumental goal-oriented nature of partisan afﬁliations;
identiﬁcation with a party implies preferences for particular
government policies or resonance with certain ideological
postures and core political values. This perspective is most
closely associated with the work of Anthony Downs (1957).
Such a view is not necessarily at odds with a social psychological characterization. In practice, there may be a good deal
of overlap between the two. Recognition of oneself as a member of, say, an ethnic minority group could carry with it
preferences for government actions that further the representation of the group. Consequently, social identities and
group interests might jointly underlie partisan inclusion.
Although scholars vary in the theoretical conceptualization of partisanship, it is clear that the roots of partisan group
membership extend to childhood socialization experiences
(Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008;
Miller and Shanks 1996; Wolak 2009). Social identities, personal values, and basic orientations toward party politics
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emerge well before one reaches voting age. The foundations
that are established in these early years shape partisan attitudes over the life course, making party identiﬁcation one
of the most stable political dispositions for Americans. Campaigns and other major political events might make speciﬁc
issues more prominent or bring to mind particular considerations about government ofﬁcials and policies, which in
turn could inﬂuence beliefs and feelings about the parties
(Carsey and Layman 2006; Green et al. 2002). Yet absent a
major restructuring of partisan coalitions, we would expect
the distribution of partisanship within the mass public to be
consistent over time.
For foreign-born residents of the United States, identiﬁcations with a party could be more ﬂuid and tentative. The
vast majority of immigrants in the country settled after their
formative childhood years. Without an early familiarity with
the American political system, immigrants are liable to approach party politics in the United States with a large amount
of uncertainty (Abrajano 2010; Abrajano and Alvarez 2010;
Hajnal and Lee 2011; Wals 2013; Wong et al. 2011). To be
sure, various social identities and policy postures—the raw
material for partisan afﬁliations—are evident for the foreignborn. In focus group discussions with migrants from Latin
America, for example, Schildkraut (2013) reports that subjects were ever mindful of their shared identities as “newcomers” and “immigrants” who are distinctive in many ways
compared to the dominant population.1 When commenting on public policy issues, they indicated that “it matters
strongly whether the politicians they support pay attention
to the needs and policy preferences of immigrants” (38).
Schildkraut notes that the policies that came up were not
only conventional ones (e.g., education, security, crime, or
the economy) but also “immigrant-speciﬁc,” such as criticism of harsh deportation measures taken by US authorities
and the exploitation of immigrants in the workplace. Comparable “immigrant-speciﬁc” policy dispositions emerge as
well in large-N surveys of foreign-born Latinos (e.g., Branton
2007; Rousem, Wilkinson, and Garand 2010).
For many immigrants, whether and how these identities
and preferences relate to partisan politics in the United States
may be far from clear. The parties themselves add to these
uncertainties by investing only modestly in direct personal
outreach to the foreign-born (Bloemraad, Voss, and Lee 2011;
Jones-Correa 1998; Wong 2006). In the last great wave of
migrant settlement a century ago, local parties served as

1. Wong et al. (2011) ﬁnd that Asian immigrants in the United States
are similarly prone to adopt social identities related to their distinctive
“foreign-born ethnic” background.

leading agents of immigrant political incorporation (Silbey
2001). Today party organizations at this grassroots level are
largely invisible to both the foreign-born and the nativeborn (Wong 2006). Partisan energies are instead concentrated on getting candidates elected, which means reaching
out periodically during campaigns to their most reliable voters. Most immigrants currently living in the United States
are not American citizens and would never be placed on
contact lists for neighborhood partisan canvassers. Many of
those who have become naturalized may not have a sufﬁciently lengthy voting history to attract the attention of party
mobilizers. Given this lack of attention, Hajnal and Lee
(2011) and Wong et al. (2011) view “nonpartisanship” as a
rationally adaptive option for many of the foreign-born.
While the strategic environment surrounding party politics today no doubt hinders the emergence of partisan bonds
among immigrants, relatively little is known about how the
foreign-born react to the outreach efforts that the two parties do in fact undertake, namely, the robust dissemination
of political messages during national campaign cycles. Short
candidate-centered campaign commercials, photo-ops, and
the like are invitations to join the political club. Even in an
age when ads are microtargeted for narrow audiences, all
immigrants are likely exposed to such messages (McCann
and Jones-Correa 2016). Campaign outreach to Latinos in
particular often advances two interrelated themes, which correspond to the two theoretical conceptualizations of partisanship that are prevalent in the scholarly literature—an appeal to general interests, that is, “join us because of the values,
principles, and political goals we have in common,” and an
appeal to group belonging and solidarity, that is, “people like
you are welcome here” (Abrajano 2010, 47–52; Connaughton
2005). Both types of messages could be compelling for immigrants, making the American party system more approachable. Since the 1990s, campaign organizations have made
special efforts to reach out to foreign-born Latinos by airing
increasing numbers of political ads in Spanish (Abrajano
2010; Barreto, Merolla, and DeFrancesco Soto 2011).
Although no previous research has examined how immigrant partisanship changes during major campaigns, Alvarez
and García Bedolla (2003) report in a study of Latino voters
(including both US-born Latinos and naturalized immigrants)
that in comparison to Anglos, the partisan attitudes of Latinos are shaped to a greater extent by “political” forces. Other
works have found that campaigns can have signiﬁcant effects
on Latino voter participation rates (e.g., Abrajano 2010: Barreto
et al. 2011; DeFrancesco Soto and Merolla 2006; García Bedolla
and Michelson 2012; Panagopoulos and Green 2010). In light
of this literature, it is reasonable to assume that Latino immigrants are cognizant of election-year political conﬂict and out-
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reach. Our central hypothesis is that in such periods, they
more readily afﬁliate with a party.
This expectation could imply that many of the foreignborn are open-minded “ﬂoating partisans” who move toward the Democrats or Republicans depending on the balance of partisan campaign messages that reach them in an
election cycle. If this were the case, it would be difﬁcult to
argue that such individuals are emerging “partisans” in a
truly meaningful sense. There are reasons to suspect, however, that immigrants do not “ﬂoat” evenly between the two
camps in response to campaign stimuli. Messages from
Democratic candidates could make more of a difference, in
that the foreign-born likely harbor greater uncertainty about
their ﬁt with the Democrats vis-à-vis Republicans. Even in
an era of growing political polarization, the Democrats have
been described as a relatively more moderate and heterogeneous “catch-all” party in comparison to the Republicans
(Muirhead 2014, 11). This is especially true for issues related to cultural diversity and immigration. Within Congress,
DW-NOMINATE scores indicate that the Republicans have
moved further as a group to the right in these areas than
the Democrats have to the left (D’Antonio, Tuch, and Baker
2013). These differences between the two partisan camps
are evident as well in surveys of Republican and Democratic
convention delegates and ﬁnancial supporters (see ﬁgs. A1–
A3 in the appendix, available online).
Few of the Latino immigrants in our panel surveys would
have been familiar with congressional voting records, and
there would have been little to no direct contact with partisan elites. Nevertheless, government ofﬁcials, convention
delegates, and political contributors provide important cues
about where the Democrats and Republicans stand on key
policy debates, which groups are part of each coalition, and
what it means to be a partisan (Carmines and Stimson 1989).
The foreign-born would likely pick up on the rather clear and
polarizing signals regarding immigration from Republican
leaders and activists between election cycles. This could blunt
the more positive messages of inclusion that Republican candidates disseminate during a campaign, given the salience of
“immigrant-speciﬁc” policies within this population.
Another factor that could moderate the effects of campaigns on partisanship is an immigrant’s pre-existing degree of incorporation into economic, social, cultural, civic,
and political life in the United States. Prior research shows
that the longer an immigrant has resided in the country, the
higher the probability of identifying with a party. Those
who possess more socioeconomic resources are more apt to
be partisans, as are immigrants who have become naturalized
citizens or are more interested in American politics (Cain
et al. 1991; Hajnal and Lee 2011; Wong 2000; Wong et al.
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2011). This previous work points to the possibility that immigrants who possess fewer resources, are less motivated to
follow public affairs, or have resided in the United States for
less time are especially moved by campaign invitations; the
better resourced, the more highly engaged, and the more experienced may possess more stable partisan orientations.
Of course the absence of early childhood socialization into
American politics may prevent the foreign-born from ever
acquiring the kind of persistent attachments to a party that
are characteristic of US-born Americans. Immigrants may
never feel so “at home” in a political party that they are unmoved by campaigns. The hypothesis that election-year political outreach pulls immigrants toward the party system—
but that this effect is more profound on the Democratic side
and is especially strong for the less incorporated—is examined in the following section.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND FINDINGS
To estimate the impact of political campaigns on the partisan
attachments of immigrants, we draw from panel surveys of
the Mexican-born population in 2006 and 2008, where noncitizens as well as citizens were sampled. Panel surveys have
long been recognized as essential for tracking campaign effects
within the general electorate (Bartels 2006). To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst instance in which election-year panel
studies have been used to trace the dynamics of political
attitudes speciﬁcally among the foreign-born.2

Study 1, the 2006 midterms
In June of 2006, a relatively quiescent time in the midterm
election cycle, telephone interviews were conducted with
753 Mexican immigrants across three sampling sites, Dallas,
San Diego, and north-central Indiana, including Indianapolis but excluding the Chicago region. Respondents were
recruited randomly through records obtained from a wellestablished marketing research ﬁrm specializing in the Latino

2. We are aware of only one other academically rigorous survey of the
foreign-born conducted during a major national election cycle where
respondents were interviewed more than once, the 2012 Latino Immigrant
National Election Study (LINES). Approximately one-third of the 1,304
participants in this study were surveyed right before the elections that year
and then immediately afterward, a design that is similar to the traditional
“pre/post” framework of the American National Election Study. While the
2012 LINES is a uniquely valuable resource for investigating the political
attitudes of immigrants at the height of a campaign season (McCann and
Jones-Correa 2016), this framework does not permit the modeling of
campaign effects over time, given that the pre- and post-election interviews
were spaced quite closely together and very few of the survey items were
repeated; respondents in this study reported their party identiﬁcation only
once.

1200 / Partisanship by Invitation James A. McCann and Katsuo A. Nishikawa Chávez

community.3 Immediately after the November elections, as
many immigrants as possible were contacted for another
interview (N p 264).4 The three sampling areas were selected to maximize variation in settlement areas and demographic proﬁles (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Dallas and
San Diego are major traditional destinations for migrants,
with a current combined Mexican-born population at the
time of the survey of over one million. Immigrants in these
locations do not need to go out of their way to ﬁnd social
services in Spanish, and Latinos occupy a variety of ofﬁces
in local government. North-central Indiana is typical of
“new” settlement destinations for Mexicans and other immigrant groups. Between 2000 and 2004, the number of
Indiana-based Mexicans rose by approximately 60,000. Out
of all metropolitan areas in the United States, Indianapolis
had the ﬁfth-highest rate of Latino population growth dur3. N p 350 in Dallas, 125 in San Diego, and 277 in Indiana. Nearly all
interviews were conducted in Spanish, and on average they lasted just over
20 minutes. Interviewing Services of America (Van Nuys, CA), a ﬁrm with
a long track record of academic survey research on Latinos, administered
the interviews. Since no ready-to-use listings of immigrants are available
in the three regional sites, random samples of “Mexican heritage” households were obtained from Geoscape International (Miami, FL). Up to 15
attempts were made to reach a respondent. Because the telephone records
contained both US-born Mexican-Americans and immigrants in unknown
proportions, and many lines were out of service, there is no straightforward
way to calculate a rate of response. If disconnected telephone lines, calls that
were never answered, busy signals, and individuals who asked to be contacted again before interviewers could determine whether they ﬁt the study
proﬁle are counted as “nonresponses” (per the AAPOR RR1 calculation), the
estimated response rate is a rather low 11%. However, if the response rate is
deﬁned as the ratio of completed interviews/attempted interviews of subjects
known to ﬁt the study protocol (i.e., RR5 in the AAPOR guide), this ﬁgure is
dramatically higher at 89%. Whatever the method for calculating response
rates, it is worth noting that with respect to key background variables such as
gender, age, level of education, church attendance, and language use at home,
study participants are similar to the Mexican-born respondents in other
large-scale surveys (e.g., Moreno 2005).
4. Near the end of the 753 interviews in June, respondents were asked
if they would be willing to take part in another survey during the fall; 655
(or approximately 87%) agreed to this, left their ﬁrst name or nickname,
and gave up to two telephone numbers where they could be called. In November, we were able to reach and interview 264 Mexicans for the second
round. This represents a successful contact rate of 40%, using a baseline of
668 potential interviewees, or a rate of 35% if the baseline is the original
753 who were queried about participating in a follow-up survey wave. The
most common reason for a respondent to be dropped from the panel was
a telephone line that was no longer in service. In cases where the line was still
active and the respondent could be reached (with up to 15 attempts), nearly
all (97% participated in the survey. Panel attrition is not signiﬁcantly related
to partisanship or most of the socioeconomic and demographic variables
(level of afﬂuence, gender, level of education, language use, religious practice,
or time spent in the United States). There is a small but statistically signiﬁcant correlation between age and being included in the second survey wave.
As in the ﬁrst wave, nearly all interviews in November were conducted in
Spanish, with each lasting approximately 16 minutes on average.

ing this period (Sagamore Institute for Policy Research
2006). While the number of Mexicans now living in Indiana
is much smaller than in California or Texas, this rapid expansion of immigrant communities was unprecedented in
the state.
In each survey wave, the questionnaire contained instrumentation to gauge partisan group membership using the
traditional “Michigan” root item, “Generally, when thinking
about American politics, do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or something else?” The
distributions of party identiﬁcation appear in table 1. Patterns in June are in keeping with previous work that ﬁnds
low levels of partisanship among the Latino foreign-born
(Hajnal and Lee 2011; Wong 2006). The Mexicans in this
study were generally reluctant at that point in the year to
afﬁliate with either the Democrats or the Republicans; over
three-fourths declined to identify personally as a partisan.5
Among those expressing some form of partisanship, there
was no clear tilt toward one camp or the other.
In the November survey round, a very different distribution is apparent. The incidence of partisanship was noticeably higher at that time, and the breakdown clearly favored
the Democrats, with a gain of 17 percentage points.6 The
midterm campaigns appear to have pulled many toward the
party. Of course a large number of immigrants in November
remained outside a partisan fold. Nevertheless, this signiﬁcant change in partisan afﬁliations over just a ﬁve-month
period is impressive.7
No equivalent swings in partisanship occurred among
US-born Latinos during these midterm elections. This is evident in the percentages in the lower part of table 1. In June of
2006, the Pew Hispanic Center conducted a nationally representative telephone survey of Latinos, most of whom were
5. The distribution of partisanship in June for the 264 immigrants
who were successfully contacted and interviewed again following the
November elections is quite similar to that for all 743 respondents in this
initial wave: 18% were Democrats, 8% were Republicans, and 74% were
neither.
6. Statistical analysis of marginal homogeneity (the Stuart-Maxwell
test) indicates that the distribution of partisan identiﬁcation following the
election was signiﬁcantly different from that in the June wave ( p ! .001).
7. It is worth noting that comparative evaluations of the two major
parties followed a trajectory that was similar to party identiﬁcation from
June to November. In each survey wave, respondents evaluated the Democrats and Republicans on a 0–10-point scale ranging from “very bad” to
“very good.” In the June wave, 23% gave the Democrats higher ratings
than the Republicans, 27% evaluated the Republicans more highly, and half
gave them the same score or did not rate one or both of the parties. In
November, the number of respondents giving the Democrats a higher score
rose considerably to 42%, and only 18% at that time evaluated the Republicans more highly; the number that did not rate one party more favorably than the other dropped by 10 points.
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Table 1. Party Identiﬁcation among Mexican Immigrants
and US-Born Latinos: Pre-campaign and Campaign Period
Comparisons, 2006

June
(%)
Mexican immigrants:
Democrat
Republican
Neither Democrat
nor Republican
Total
N
US-born Latinos:
Democrat
Republican
Neither Democrat
nor Republican
Total
N

October/November
(%)

14
9

31
6

77

63

100
743

100
264

42
22

41
27

36

33

100
575

100
3,588

Change in
Partisanship
(%)

117
23

21
15

Source. Authors’ two-wave panel survey of Mexican immigrants administered by telephone and conducted in collaboration with Wayne Cornelius
and David Leal; Pew Hispanic Center “2006 National Survey of Latinos”
(http://www.pewhispanic.org/ 2006/07/13/2006-national-survey-of-latinos/),
administered by telephone between June 5 and July 3, 2006; and “2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study” (http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/cces
/home), conducted via the Internet in October.
Note. Party identiﬁcation was measured using versions of the traditional
ANES wording, “Generally, when thinking about American politics, do
you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or something else?” (Mexican immigrants); “In politics today, do you consider
yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?”
(US-born Latinos in June); and “Generally speaking, do you think of
yourself as a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or [other: specify]?” (USborn Latinos in October). Nearly all interviews with Mexican immigrants
were conducted in Spanish; US-born Latinos were interviewed in English.

born in the United States. The timing of this study coincided
almost exactly with the ﬁrst wave of the Mexican immigrant
panel. Among the native-born Latinos in the Pew poll, 42%
considered themselves Democrats, 22% were Republicans,
and 36% did not afﬁliate with either party. Four months later,
at the height of the midterm campaign season, the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study was ﬁelded via the
Internet. In total, 3,588 US-born Latinos took part in this
investigation. In spite of the difference in survey mode, the
breakdown in partisanship is nearly identical to that in the
Pew study.8 Identiﬁcation with the Republican Party ex8. The Pew Hispanic Center allowed respondents to be surveyed in
either English or Spanish. To make these percentages for partisanship
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panded, but only by a very narrow margin, and the percent
afﬁliating with the Democrats dropped by one point.9
The fact that an appreciable number of Mexican immigrants moved toward the American party system in the fall
of 2006, and that the Democratic Party was the beneﬁciary
of this rise in partisanship, suggests that Republican invitations to “join the club” fell on deaf ears. Individual-level
analysis supports this interpretation. As shown in a separate
table in the appendix (table A1; tables A1–A5 are available
online), more than one out of ﬁve immigrants changed
from nonpartisanship to identiﬁcation with a party, with
nearly all joining the Democrats. Some Mexicans left the
party system during this period, but movement toward a
party was clearly the dominant pattern. Approximately half
of the sample did not express a partisan afﬁliation in either
survey wave, which speaks to the limits of partisan incorporation. Yet the ﬁnding that nearly 50% of the immigrants
identiﬁed as a partisan at one or both periods indicates a
relatively high incidence of membership. This is, after all, a
subpopulation that has been described previously as largely
outside the boundaries of American party politics. At the
same time, there is evidence of a persistent disinclination to
join the Republican Party. Only 4% of the sample moved
from nonpartisanship to identiﬁcation as a Republican. This
change was more than matched by movement away from
the party. Furthermore, the number of consistent Republicans was vanishingly low (1%). These patterns are suggestive of well-established negative partisanship, as hypothesized above.
Panel survey ﬁndings from the American National Election Study (ANES) are also presented in table A1 to offer a
point of contrast. Over the course of the 2006 campaigns,
no panel surveys similar to the Mexican immigrant study
were done within the wider American electorate. Data from
the 2008 ANES consequently serve as a comparative bench-

among US-born Latinos comparable to those from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, which was administered only in English, those
few native-born Latinos in the Pew poll who were interviewed partly or
entirely in Spanish were dropped.
9. The 2006 CCES included a post-election wave in November, and
partisanship was gauged again at that time. This item is not useful for
comparative purposes, however, since the instrumentation was different
from that in the Pew Hispanic Center poll and the Mexican immigrant
surveys. When reporting their partisanship in the November installment of
the CCES, respondents were asked an abbreviated version of the traditional
question, with only “Democrat,” “Republican,” and “Independent” allowed
(i.e., the “something else” option was omitted). Moreover, the measurement of party identiﬁcation at that time was not prefaced by the phrase
“generally speaking,” a notable departure from standard practice. The instrumentation in October, however, followed the conventional wording
and so is used here.
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mark. The mobilization environment in a presidential election year is typically more intense compared to midterm
campaigns, and political competition in the 2008 cycle was
particularly contentious. In January of that year, the ANES
ﬁelded the ﬁrst wave of a long-term Internet-based panel
survey. Partisan identiﬁcations for US-born Latinos, African
Americans, and whites between that point and the postelection period—a much longer timespan than that covered
in the 2006 panel—were extremely stable. The partisan messages that ﬁlled the airwaves as the 2008 campaigns progressed did not affect partisan identities for the US-born.
Unlike in the immigrant sample, the boundaries of partisanship were in place prior to the campaigns.
Did shifts in immigrant partisanship vary by levels of socioeconomic, cultural, and civic resources, or by levels of interest in US politics? As the political climate became richer

with mobilization messages, the less-resourced and lessmotivated may have been especially prone to becoming a
partisan. Such variation in effects is explored through multivariate analysis. Table 2 presents the results from a logistic
regression model where the dependent variable is identiﬁcation as a partisan in November. The predictors in this
model capture the major dimensions of social, economic, and
civic life that have been linked to the political incorporation
of immigrants: place of residence; civic status; time spent in
the United States; attention to US politics; level of formal education; gender; age; afﬂuence, as indicated by an inventory
of household amenities; language use at home; involvement
in religious services; the number of close friends and family
members who still resided in Mexico; and the frequency of
sending funds back to Mexico. The latter two variables touch
on whether interpersonal networks for respondents were

Table 2. Logistic Regression Model of Partisan Identiﬁcation among Mexican
Immigrants in November 2006
SE

Odds Ratio (eb)

.33

3.97

2.28
.03

.42
.27

.76
1.03

2.52
2.69

.64
.67

.59
.50

.21
.01
.11
2.01
2.41
2.03
.21
.05

.18
.02
.09
.02
.33
.26
.28
.13

1.23
1.01
1.12
1.00
.67
.97
1.23
1.05

.15
2.02
22.25

.17
.13
1.82

1.16
.98
.11

Coefﬁcient (b)
Identify with a partyJune 2006
Sampling location:
San Diego
Indiana
Civic status:
Noncitizen with papers
Noncitizen without papers
Personal background factor:
Interest in US politics
Time in the United States (years)
Education level
Age (years)
Gender (female)
Household afﬂuence
Language use at home
Religious attendance
Transnational ties:
Family and friends in Mexico
Send remittances
Constant

1.38**

Source. Authors’ telephone panel surveys of Mexican immigrants.
Note. N p 753; missing values were imputed via MI (chained equations), with 20 imputations. The
dependent variable is coded 1 for respondents who identiﬁed with a party in the November wave, and 0
otherwise. Partisan identiﬁcation in the June wave was dummy-coded (1 p identify as Democrat or
Republican). See the appendix (table A5) for other item wordings and coding. Collinearity diagnostics
indicate low variance inﬂation factors (VIF). The results for a comparable multinomial logistic regression model, where the dependent variable takes on three values (identify in November as a
Democrat, as a Republican, or with neither party), are given in the appendix (table A2).
1
p ! .10.
* p ! .05.
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oriented toward the sending or receiving country. To control for the stability of partisanship, so that change in attitude from June to November is modeled, lagged values of the
dependent variable are also included as predictors (Bartels
2006).10
Contrary to expectations, the coefﬁcients in table 2 uncover little to no variation in campaign effects across subgroups. The only signiﬁcant predictor is the lagged dependent variable (p ! .01). There is little evidence to support the
notion that campaigns exert an especially strong pull on
immigrants who lack the resources or interests that might
otherwise propel them toward the party system. Even among
well-established immigrants, political outreach can affect
partisan connections. If the dependent variable is instead
coded on a three-point categorical scale (Democrat, Republican, or nonpartisan) to take into account movement toward a speciﬁc party between June and November, comparable ﬁndings emerge (see table A2 in the appendix).
These analyses offer much evidence for the propositions
that for Mexicans the boundaries of membership in the
Democratic Party grow as campaigns proceed, that these immigrants are never so rooted that they are unresponsive to
Democratic campaign signals, but that Republican messages
are ineffective. However, while panel survey designs provide
exceptional leverage for making such causal inferences, it is
possible that differences in responsiveness to campaigns are
instead due to variations in exposure to political signals in
the ﬁrst place. In the fall of 2006, Mexican immigrants might
have seen and heard fewer Republican messages. Given this
possibility, a second study was conducted to conﬁrm the
interpretations from the 2006 midterms.

Study 2, the 2008 presidential election
Tracing the impact of campaign communication is notoriously difﬁcult because of measurement challenges. When
asked how often they have seen or heard political commercials or received pamphlets from a campaign, many survey
respondents simply cannot recall their exposure accurately
(Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and Simon 1999). In the preceding
analysis, we inferred that changes in partisanship among
Mexicans between June and November of 2006 came about
from reactions to campaign stimuli. This is a reasonable interpretation, but it would be more compelling to have direct
and accurate measures of exposure to mobilization appeals.

10. When estimating this logistic regression model, missing values
were multiply imputed via chained equations. Recent work by Peytchev
(2012) suggests that multiple imputation is an effective way to correct for
potential attrition biases in panel surveys and also obtain more efﬁcient
estimates.
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For this reason, a randomized political advertising experiment was embedded in a second two-wave panel survey conducted during the 2008 presidential campaign.
As in 2006, randomly selected immigrants from Mexico
were interviewed by telephone using a similar sampling
frame, with similar rates of response. Nearly all surveys were
again in Spanish.11 In total, 1,023 respondents took part in
the ﬁrst wave of the study, which commenced after the Labor
Day weekend and continued through the month of September. Sampling this time was in two regions rather than
three: north-central Indiana (N p 501), again excluding the
Chicago area, and San Antonio, TX (N p 522). The reduction
in survey sites raised the number of respondents in each area,
which serves to increase the statistical power for regional
and demographic comparisons. San Antonio was chosen in
place of Dallas because its Mexican population is larger and
somewhat better established.12 These features offer a more
advantageous contrast with the emerging Mexican population of Indiana.
A few minutes into the ﬁrst wave interview, respondents
were randomly divided into three groups. Approximately
half were chosen to listen over the telephone to a 60-second
Spanish-language ad either for Barack Obama (N p 262)
or John McCain (N p 250). These were actual ads produced
for Latino radio stations. Each featured an enthusiastic endorsement from a member of the Latino community. In the
Obama spot, the speaker was a youthful-sounding male with
a middle-class Mexican accent. For the McCain ad, a former
roommate of the nominee and native Spanish speaker was
recruited for the part. The text of the two commercials is
given in table A4. During major campaigns, short positive
ads like these are ubiquitous on Spanish-language television
and radio stations (Abrajano 2010). Although the focus was
primarily on the individual nominees, a central theme in
both advertisements was multicultural solidarity and shared
interests within the partisan fold.
The goal in exposing respondents to an ad was to gauge
more precisely than in 2006 how such campaign stimuli
inﬂuence partisan afﬁliations and whether any effects persist until the end of the campaign. Subjects were told simply
that researchers wished to know whether the ad in their opin11. The ﬁrm Interviewing Services of America again administered the
interviews, with telephone numbers drawn from “Mexican heritage”
households. The rate of completed interviews/attempted interviews for
subjects found to ﬁt the subject proﬁle (RR5) was just over 90%.
12. In the San Antonio sample, respondents had lived in the United
States an average of 23 years, which is signiﬁcantly longer than in either
the Dallas or San Diego samples in 2006. Moreover, nearly half of the
immigrants in San Antonio reported being naturalized US citizens, a proportion that is substantially higher than in the Indiana sample.
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ion gave a positive or negative impression of the candidate.
(Not surprisingly, very few Mexicans in either treatment
group believed that a negative impression was conveyed.) A
third set of study participants (N p 511) served as the control group.13 Shortly after the 2008 elections, as many respondents as possible from both sampling locations were interviewed again (total N p 486, a 48% recontact rate).14
One to two minutes after the ad exposure experiment in
September, all respondents were asked to rate the major
party presidential candidates using a 0 (very bad) to 10
(very good) scale. A three-point categorical measure was
constructed from these evaluations: (a) higher rating given
to Obama; (b) higher rating for McCain; (c) all other respondents. The distributions of these evaluations, broken
down by experimental group, are given in table 3. Among
subjects in the control group, the relative attractiveness of
Barack Obama is apparent and not surprising (Bowler and
Segura 2012). Over half viewed the Democratic nominee
more positively than John McCain. One-third did not give
either nominee a higher rating, and 12% had a relatively more
favorable impression of McCain. Using these percentages as
a baseline, it is clear that in the short-term, both ads were
remarkably effective in molding opinions about the nominees. Listening to the McCain campaign ad boosted the candidate’s standing by 22 percentage points. The Obama radio
spot caused his relative favorability to rise 20 points, another
very strong impact. Each of these effects is highly signiﬁcant.
Even though both candidates had been in the public eye for
many months, neither was so well known that impressions
had hardened. These results imply that Mexican immigrants,
after only a slight amount of prompting, are fairly open to
supporting Republican leaders.
Equally clear, however, is the reluctance to elevate assessments of the Republican Party. The McCain ad that car13. As a check on randomization procedures, bivariate correlations
between all of the major demographic variables included in the questionnaire and assignment into one of the experimental groups were calculated. No signiﬁcant correlations were found.
14. Approximately one-ﬁfth of the respondents from September of
2008 dropped out of the post-election wave because they were no longer
reachable at the telephone line that had been used just two months earlier.
Another 26% of the ﬁrst wave respondents apparently still used the same
telephone number but could not be reached after more than 15 attempts.
Only 3% of the survey participants in the ﬁrst wave declined to take part in
the second interview when successfully contacted again. Panel attrition
was not signiﬁcantly correlated with partisanship and most socioeconomic
and demographic traits: gender, place of residence, level of afﬂuence, citizenship and documentation status, education level, time spent in the
United States, and language use at home. Nor was attrition correlated with
the campaign advertising experimental treatments. As in 2006, however,
there was a slight (and statistically signiﬁcant) tendency for younger respondents from the ﬁrst wave to drop out.

Table 3. Short-Term Impact of Campaign Ad Exposure on
Relative Evaluations of the Presidential Candidates
and Parties

No Ad
Exposure
(%)
Relative candidate evaluations:
Higher rating for Obama
Higher rating for McCain
Neither rated higher than
the other
Total
Likelihood ratio test (x22)
Relative partisan evaluations:
Higher rating for Democrats
Higher rating for Republicans
Neither rated higher than
the other
Total
Likelihood ratio test (x22)

Randomized
Exposure
to an Ad
(%)
Obama

McCain

54
12

74
4

35
34

34

22

31

100

100
34.1**

100
51.4**

43
17

55
13

46
23

41

32

31

101

100
9.9**

100
7.8*

Source. Authors’ telephone surveys of Mexican immigrants in San Antonio and Indiana, September 2008, conducted in collaboration with Stacey
Connaughton.
Note. N p 1,023 (262 in the Obama ad group, 250 in the McCain ad group,
and 511 in the control group). Approximately one to two minutes after the
administration of the advertising treatment, respondents evaluated the
major parties and candidates using a scale from 0 (very bad) to 10 (very
good). These scores were used to calculate relative candidate and partisan
evaluations. The likelihood-ratio test indicates the statistical signiﬁcance of
differences in response proportions between an experimental treatment
group and the control group.
1
p ! .10.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.

ried so much punch when the presidential nominees were
evaluated had a much more subdued effect on the relative
appeal of Republicans as an organization. In fact, exposure
to the commercial for McCain actually caused favorability
ratings for both parties to jump slightly compared to the
control group, 5 points in the case of Republicans and 3 for
the Democrats. Listening to the Obama campaign commercial had a very different effect. In this instance, the increase
in the relative favorability of Democrats is not as great
as that for Obama himself, but it is nonetheless large—a
12 point gain (55% vs. 43% for immigrants in the control
group). These ﬁndings lend strong support to the hypothe-
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sis that campaigns cultivate a sense of partisanship for this
population but that minds are generally made up when considering the Republican Party.
Can listening to a brief political advertisement shape
partisan identiﬁcations over the duration of the campaign?
If so, this would help account for the rather large campaign
effects observed in the 2006 midterms within an immigrant
population that is not widely targeted by the parties; a modest amount of exposure to political messages may pay dividends over the long run. It would be unrealistic to expect
respondents in either of the treatment groups to remember
the contents of a commercial for very long. Few commit such
minutia to long-term memory. Yet changes in the summary
judgments immigrants make about the parties or about their
own identities as partisans could persist weeks or months
after exposure to an ad. Hill et al. (2013) posit that a particular persuasive message disseminated during a campaign
could affect opinions weeks or months later if there are
subsequent reinforcing stimuli in the political environment;
“communication effects may be, and perhaps often are, held
in place by a long-term ﬂow of communication” (Hill et al.
2013, 523). After taking part in the ﬁrst wave of the survey,
respondents experienced another four to eight weeks of intense partisan conﬂict and mobilization. This is certainly the
kind of environment that could have reinforced the changes
in partisanship that were induced in September.
When contacted again after the election, the impact of
exposure to the Obama ad was indeed reﬂected in the distribution of partisan identiﬁcation (see table 4). For the control subjects at this time, 47% considered themselves Democrats, while only 7% were Republicans. Tellingly, among
immigrants who were exposed to the Obama ad, the level
of Democratic identiﬁcation was considerably higher at 62%.
This is an extraordinary effect in light of the rather minor experimental intervention—exposure to a single short advertisement many weeks earlier. No comparable impact is seen
within the McCain advertising group. This constitutes solid
evidence for the hypothesis that the Mexican-born respond
to campaign invitations but that there is much resistance to
overtures from the Republican side.
Given that all of the immigrants in the panel would have
been exposed to campaign advertisements and other political stimuli between September and November, the results
from this experiment and those from study 1 suggest that
afﬁliations with the Democratic Party, but not the Republicans, would have increased from one survey wave to the
next even for respondents in the control group. This expectation is conﬁrmed by comparing pre-treatment benchmark distributions of party identiﬁcation from September to
breakdowns of partisanship following the election (middle
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and bottom of table 4). Prior to the application of the treatments, 35% of the subjects who were randomly selected for
the control group identiﬁed as Democrats. Among these respondents, the number of Democrats grew by 12 points come
November. This increase is highly signiﬁcant, as indicated by
the Stuart-Maxwell chi-square test of change in proportions
between two panel waves. For Mexicans in the McCain advertisement group, the gain in Democratic identiﬁcation over
this period is comparable to that for the control subjects and
nearly matches the increase in Democratic afﬁliation over
the course of the 2006 immigrant panel study (table 1). Respondents in the Obama treatment group evidenced a steeper
rise in Democratic ties (120%) owing to their greater exposure to mobilizing signals from that party.15
To assess subgroup variations in political advertising
effects, party identiﬁcations gauged in November were regressed on the two experimental treatment indicators and
the same resource and motivational items from the 2006 midterm panel: place of residence (San Antonio or north-central
Indiana), civic status (citizen, noncitizen with papers, or undocumented), level of interest in American politics, time
spent in the United States, education level, gender, household afﬂuence, religious attendance, language use, the number of family and friends still residing in Mexico, and the frequency of sending remittances to that country; pre-treatment
party identiﬁcation and ideological positions (dummy variables indicating whether the respondent identiﬁed as being on
the “left” or “right”) were also included in the set of predictors.
Multiplicative interaction terms were then added one at a
time to the model to test whether the immigrants’ prior levels
of incorporation into American economic, social, culture,
and civic life affect responsiveness to campaign signals. No
noteworthy interactions surfaced. These ﬁndings are given
in the appendix (table A3). As in the analysis from 2006, the
immigrants in this sample responded to the ads in a generally uniform manner, connecting more closely to the Democratic Party while keeping their distance from the Republicans.
Before concluding, the causal mechanisms driving these
connections may be explored by gauging changes in perceptions of the party system following exposure to the advertising treatments. We hypothesized that uncertainty about
how the foreign-born ﬁt into the Democratic coalition would
keep many Mexican immigrants from identifying as members of that party, while somewhat more hardened doubts

15. The small and statistically insigniﬁcant likelihood-ratio x2 values
(2.1 and 2.4) reported for the distributions of pre-treatment partisanship
in the “Obama Ad” and “McCain Ad” groups demonstrate that, in accordance with randomized assignment, placement in one of these groups
was unrelated to pre-existing partisan afﬁliations.
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Table 4. Long-Term Impact of Campaign Ad Exposure in September of 2008 on Party Identiﬁcation Following
the November Election
No Ad Exposure
(%)
Control Group
Party identiﬁcation, November:
Democrat
Republican
Neither Democrat nor Republican
Total
Likelihood ratio test (x22)
Longitudinal comparisons:
Party identiﬁcation, September, pre-treatment:
Democrat
Republican
Neither Democrat nor Republican
Total
Likelihood ratio test (x22)
Change in partisan groupings, September to November:
Democrat
Republican
Neither Democrat nor Republican
Stuart-Maxwell x22

47
7
46
100

Randomized Exposure to an Ad
(%)
Obama

62
8
30
100
9.6**

McCain

52
8
40
100
1.2

35
7
58

42
7
51

39
11
50

100

100
2.1

100
2.4

112
No change
212
12.41**

120
11
21
18.11**

113
23
210
5.031

Source. Authors’ telephone surveys of Mexican immigrants in San Antonio and Indiana, September and November 2008.
Note. N p 486 (133 in the Obama ad group, 110 in the McCain ad group, and 243 in the control group); panel attrition between
September and November is not signiﬁcantly correlated with assignment to an experimental treatment group (x22 p 2.35; p p .31). The
Stuart-Maxwell x2 indicates the statistical signiﬁcance of differences in response proportions between two panel survey waves for a given
set of respondents.
1
p ! .10.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.

about ﬁtting in with the Republicans would limit identiﬁcation as a Republican. Campaign stimuli might be effective
in counteracting the former impediment to partisanship but
not the latter. Table 5 presents evidence in keeping with
these dynamics.16
Near the end of the interview, respondents indicated how
close they believed Barack Obama and John McCain were
16. Isolating causal mechanisms requires subjecting all potential mediating variables to independent randomized manipulations. Such a design is beyond the scope of the present study. As Green, Ha, and Bullock
(2010, 202) note, “It may take decades to ﬁgure out the mechanisms that
account for the causal relationships observed in social science.” Additional
longitudinal and experimental investigations of immigrant political attitudes in future campaign cycles are needed. In instances where there are
many possible mediators and only one experimental intervention, researchers may not be able to pinpoint the exact causal pathways that
transmit the effects of a treatment. Yet insights about causal sequences

to the Mexican community and whether the Democratic
and Republican parties represented “Latinos and Hispanics”
and “immigrants.” Personal impressions of Obama and
McCain were combined to create a three-point comparative measure (Obama is closer to the Mexican community,
McCain is closer, or neither is closer). In the control group,
approximately half of the respondents saw no clear difference between the two nominees. Among those who saw a
difference, Obama was viewed as closer by a three-to-one
margin (36% vs. 11%). Exposure to the ad for McCain
changed this margin signiﬁcantly, increasing the number
may be gained by measuring several potential outcome variables. If certain
outcomes are affected by the treatment as theorized, one can begin to
build a persuasive case about the causal mechanisms underlying an effect.
This is our aim in probing the impact of exposure to political advertisements on perceptions of the candidates and parties.

Volume 78

Table 5. Impact of Campaign Ads on Impressions of the
Candidates and Parties

No Ad
Exposure
(%)
Candidate that is closest to
the Mexican community:
Obama
McCain
No difference, not sure
Total
Likelihood ratio test (x22)
Party that best represents
the interests of . . .
Latinos and Hispanics:
Democrats
Republicans
No difference, not sure

36
11
53
100

31
9
60

Total
Likelihood ratio test (x22)
Immigrants:
Democrats
Republicans
No difference, not sure

100

Total
Likelihood ratio test (x22)

101

31
10
60

Randomized
Exposure to
an Ad
(%)
Obama

47
8
45
100
7.9*

42
9
49
100
11.0**
41
12
48
100
9.9**

McCain

26
26
48
100
27.8**

31
16
53
100
7.7*
30
12
58
100
1.4

Note. Perceptions of the candidates’ closeness to the Mexican community
were measured following the experimental treatments in September through
four-point scales (1 p not at all close, 4 p very close). These responses were
used to calculate relative assessments. Perceptions of comparative partisan
representativeness were gauged shortly thereafter through items asking the
extent to which the [Democratic/Republican] Party represents the interests
of [Latinos and Hispanics/Immigrants]. Spanish-language wordings are given
in the appendix (table A5).
1
p ! .10.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.

believing that McCain was closer by 15 points relative to the
control group. Immigrants who heard the commercial for
Obama came away with a much better impression of the Democratic nominee, with a swing in percentages that was similar to that for the McCain advertisement group. These dynamics provide at least a partial explanation of what drove
the changes in overall candidate attractiveness that were reported in table 3. The campaign spots for Obama and McCain
were effective because they linked a candidate to a primary
social identity group for respondents.
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For subjects in the Obama advertisement treatment group,
the positive effects of the commercial extended to judgments
about the Democratic Party. Compared to the control group,
immigrants hearing the ad for Obama were decidedly more
inclined to see the Democrats as more accommodating of
“Latinos and Hispanics” and “immigrants” (p ! .01 for both
items). Exposure to the McCain campaign spot had a much
weaker impact, particularly for beliefs about the representation of the foreign-born within the Republican Party. These
ﬁndings help to ﬂesh out the causal mechanisms behind the
shifts in immigrant partisanship. Invitations from Democrats mattered in fostering afﬁliations with the party because
they repositioned the Democratic Party in the eyes of respondents as comparatively more representative than the
Republicans of their core identity groups. The McCain ad
powerfully affected perceptions of the candidate himself,
but beliefs about the Republican Party were relatively well
crystallized.

CONCLUSION
Mexican immigrants are not as far removed from party
politics in the United States as prior research has suggested.
The surveys from which earlier works on immigrant partisanship have drawn are one-shot cross-sectional studies administered for the most part outside of an electoral context.
The American party system on the other hand is inherently
dynamic. Political parties do not hibernate in between election cycles, but from the perspective of the mass public, their
organizational activities in these periods are all but invisible.
During major national elections, the two parties collaborate
with their chosen nominees to get out their messages and
get out the vote. Immigrants, especially immigrants without
voting rights, would not be the most attractive targets of
mobilization. Even so, invitations to join the party are ever
present. Partisan mobilization in elections, as Schattschneider
(1975) emphasized, is contagious and hard to contain. Regardless of one’s station in life, one cannot help but be exposed to Democratic and Republican overtures.
Longitudinal analyses from the 2006 and 2008 campaign
cycles call attention to three notable features of contemporary Mexican immigrant partisanship. First, mobilization
signals are highly consequential for self-described party membership. Many Mexicans join the party in the heat of the
campaign. This mode of democratic expression is quite distinctive in comparison to US-born Americans, whose partisan ties tend to be consistent before and after campaigns. A
second key lesson is that immigrants from Mexico who are
well resourced and well established in the United States respond to campaign invitations to the same signiﬁcant degree
as those who are less incorporated. This implies that the
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Mexican-born on the whole—and perhaps the foreign-born
population in general—may never be fully and unceasingly
integrated into a political party. Such a ﬁnding underscores
the paramount importance of early childhood political socialization in tying Americans reliably to a major party (Miller and Shanks 1996).
Finally, the survey results demonstrate persistent “negative partisanship” with respect to the Republicans, a disposition that is understandable given the political positioning of
that party over the last two decades. When gauging partisan
identities within any population, such negative dispositions
are as worthy of exploration as positive ones (Campbell et al.
1960; Medeiros and Noel 2014; Rose and Mishler 1998).
Knowing where you do not belong can be a relevant and
meaningful anchor in political affairs (Hajnal and Lee 2011;
Wong et al. 2011). Yet if partisanship within the Mexicanborn community were largely or exclusively “negative,” troubling normative implications could be raised. For the general
public, afﬁrming positive connections to a major party can
orient individuals toward the political system in a constructive
manner, provide a basis for interpreting policy issues and
evaluating government performance, and offer a framework
for collective political action (Green et al. 2002; Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe 2015; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Muirhead 2014;
Rosenblum 2008). The noteworthy rise of positive partisanship for Mexican immigrants during major national campaign
cycles can thus be taken as a welcome harbinger of democratic
inclusion (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2016; Rosenblum and
Tivig 2014; Sears, Danbold, and Zavala 2016).
The two electoral settings under scrutiny here, one a
midterm contest and the other an open presidential race,
were distinctive in many ways. The fact that each featured a
substantial increase in attachments to the Democratic Party
among Mexican immigrants points to a general recurring
pattern of campaign effects. Such a generalization, however,
should come with a slight caveat. For various reasons the
political environments in 2006 and 2008 tended to favor the
Democrats. With respect to the Mexican population in particular, the immigrant rights protests that took place in the
spring of 2006 could have led many of the foreign-born to be
especially open to mobilization signals from the Democratic
Party during the fall campaign season.17 Had panel surveys
17. These protests were staged in response to HR 4437, a bill from the
Republican-controlled US House of Representatives that would have applied severe criminal penalties to the undocumented and those who assist
them (Voss and Bloemraad 2011). Democrats were mindful of the campaign mobilization opportunities that HR 4437 presented. In the closing
days of the 2006 elections, for example, Senate Minority Leader Harry
Reid appeared on the Mexican American–oriented television network
Azteca América. “Voting gives you a voice in affordable housing. Voting

also been conducted in political climates that were less favorable toward that party, such as the 2010 or 2014 midterms, we would still expect to ﬁnd similar gains in Democratic identiﬁcations over the course of the campaign, though
perhaps with effects being more muted. Barring a major shift
in the dispositions of Republican lawmakers and party activists towards identities and issues that Mexicans and other
immigrant groups hold dear, a shift that appears improbable
at this juncture, there is likely little chance that Republican
campaign messages in any electoral environment could pull
the Mexican-born toward that party, even if Republican candidates themselves are perceived as personally attractive ﬁgures. These conjectures highlight the need for further longitudinal research on political attitudes and socialization
among immigrants, so that patterns of change and stability
may be assessed both within and across diverse electoral
cycles.
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